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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—LARGE-CAPACITY MAGAZINE BANS AND THE
SECOND AMENDMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

After taking office in 2021, President Biden and the Democratic majority
in Congress announced their intention to pursue a national prohibition on firearm magazines holding more than ten rounds, renewing the debate on this
controversial firearm component1 While there was once a temporary ban on
the manufacture and import of such magazines from 1994–2004, a total nationwide ban on their mere possession would be unprecedented.2 However,
four states and the District of Columbia have taken this radical step of total
prohibition.3 Prohibitions like these, though well-intentioned, seriously implicate fundamental rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment.4
In District of Columbia v. Heller (hereinafter Heller I), the Supreme
Court of the United States confirmed that the Second Amendment protects an

1. See, e.g., Statement by the President Three Years After the Parkland Shooting, THE
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/02/14/statement-by-the-president-three-years-after-the-parkland-shooting/ (“Today, I am calling on Congress to enact commonsense gun law reforms,
including . . . banning assault weapons and high-capacity magazines . . . [.]”); see also Menendez, Deutch Renew Push to Ban High-Capacity Gun Magazines, SENATOR BOB MENENDEZ
(Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/menendez-deutch-renewpush-to-ban-high-capacity-gun-magazines (“U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Congressman Ted Deutch (D-Fla.-22) today reintroduced the Keep Americans Safe Act, renewing
a concerted effort to ban the importation, sale, manufacturing, transfer, or possession of gun
magazines that hold more than ten rounds of ammunition.”).
2. Elke C. Meeus, Note, The Second Amendment in Need of a Shot in the Arm: Overhauling the Courts’ Standards of Scrutiny, 45 W. ST. L. REV. 29, 34 (2017).
3. Large Capacity Magazines, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/policy-areas/hardware-ammunition/large-capacity-magazines/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2021). California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Vermont, and D.C. ban possession of new large capacity magazines, while only New
York, New Jersey, Hawaii, and D.C. declined to “grandfather” magazines purchased before
the ban was enacted. Id. California’s law revoking the legal status of previously “grandfathered” magazines is stayed pending the outcome of Duncan v. Becerra. Id.; see also Duncan
v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017); Duncan v. Bonta, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 37558 (9th Cir. 2021).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020),
vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021) (“California[‘s magazine ban] substantially burdens
core Second Amendment rights . . . .”).
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individual’s right to bear arms.5 However, the Supreme Court has not decided
whether restrictions on magazine capacity violate the Second Amendment,6
and there is disagreement among the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals on the
proper analytical framework for issues involving magazine bans.7
Circuit courts have increasingly taken an interest balancing approach,
either applying intermediate or strict scrutiny depending on whether the court
believes the prohibition burdens core Second Amendment activity as defined
in Heller I.8 Most courts have ruled that magazine restrictions do not burden
core Second Amendment rights and therefore have applied intermediate scrutiny.9 In contrast, a three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter Duncan
panel) recently held that magazine restrictions burden core Second Amendment rights and therefore applied strict scrutiny, ultimately finding California’s large-capacity magazine (LCM) ban unconstitutional.10
This Duncan panel decision is the best reasoned circuit-level opinion on
the topic of magazine bans to date.11 However, it is no longer good law. Following the panel decision, the Ninth Circuit granted the State of California’s
motion to rehear the case en banc.12 In a 7-4 decision, the en banc majority
instead chose to apply intermediate scrutiny and uphold the statute.13
5. District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 627–28 (2008); see U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
6. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari in a case challenging Maryland’s magazine restriction regime); U.S. CONST. amend. II.
7. Compare Duncan, 970 F.3d 1133, with Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v.
Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020), and Friedman v. City of Highland
Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015).
8. Meeus, supra note 2, at 48; see also Lindsay Colvin, Note, History, Heller, and HighCapacity Magazines: What is the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1044–45 (2014); Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146.
9. See, e.g., N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 243.
10. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1152, 1164. As explained below, this decision has now been
vacated. See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. Lawmakers, courts, and commentators
often refer to magazines holding more than ten rounds as “large capacity magazines” and use
the abbreviation “LCM.” See, e.g., Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1141 n.1 (9th Cir. 2020),
vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021). It is worth noting, however, that these magazines come
standard with many commonly used firearms and are more aptly called “standard capacity.”
See Standard Capacity Magazines, CONG. SPORTSMEN’S FOUND., http://congressionalsportsmen.org/policies/state/full-capacity-magazines (last visited Nov. 16, 2020). Because the term
“large capacity magazine” and the abbreviation “LCM” are used so often in this field of law,
this Note will use them for convenience.
11. See infra Sections IV, VI.
12. Order to Rehear Case En Banc, Duncan v. Becerra, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021)
(No. 19-55376). At the time of writing this Note, the court had granted this order but had not
held oral arguments or published a decision. However, shortly before publication of this Note,
the Ninth Circuit released its en banc opinion. See Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1100–01
(9th Cir. 2021).
13. Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th at 1100–01. To briefly summarize this opinion, the en banc
court used the two-step analysis described later in this Note. Id.; see also infra Section II(C).
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However, the now-vacated Duncan panel decision is worth analyzing both
because it is well reasoned and because it contrasts with decisions from other
circuits that applied intermediate scrutiny.14
Courts of appeals have yet to adopt the better analytical framework suggested by Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh when he sat on the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals.15 There, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting
opinion in the second Heller v. District of Columbia case (hereinafter “Heller
II”). 16 He noted that the Supreme Court had specifically rejected interest balancing tests in the Second Amendment context.17 Instead of applying any kind
of heightened scrutiny, Kavanaugh would have applied the analytical framework used by the Supreme Court in Heller I and analyzed the law in light of
the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second Amendment.18 At least one
district court has since adopted Kavanaugh’s reasoning, though none has decided a magazine-size restriction case using this framework.19 However, some
scholars have argued that LCM restrictions would be unconstitutional under
Kavanaugh’s framework.20
This Note argues that a faithful application of the Second Amendment
will reveal that bans on magazines holding more than ten rounds are unconstitutional, no matter which test is used. Section II of this Note details the
history of Second Amendment jurisprudence.21 Section III covers the relevant
For the first step, the en banc court assumed without deciding, that California’s magazine ban
implicated Second Amendment interests. Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th at 1100–01; see also infra
Section IV(B)(1). For the second step, the en banc court first determined that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate since, in its view, the law only minimally burdened the core Second
Amendment right of self-defense within the home. Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th at 1100–01.
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the en banc court held that California’s magazine ban was a
“reasonable fit, even if an imperfect one[]” to the State’s important interest of public safety. Id.
at *17.
14. See infra Sections IV, VI.
15. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1083.
16. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1269 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 1277; see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1044; Nicholas Gallo, Comment, Misfire:
How the North Carolina Pistol Purchase Permit System Misses the Mark of Constitutional
Muster and Effectiveness, 99 N.C. L. REV. 529, 540–41 (2021) (arguing that balancing tests
like intermediate scrutiny contradict Heller).
18. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1071 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Colvin, supra note 8,
at 1044.
19. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1044 (citing Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d
1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012)); but see Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th
Cir. 2011) In Ezell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted a “text,
history, and tradition” analysis to determine whether, as a threshold matter, the conduct at issue
fell within the scope of the Second Amendment. Id. Deciding that it did, the court then moved
to a tiered scrutiny analysis. Id. at 706.
20. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1082.
21. See infra Section II.
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history of firearm magazine technology.22 Section IV discusses two U.S.
Courts of Appeals decisions that neatly illustrate the current split on magazine
bans: the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duncan v. Becerra and the Third Circuit’s decision in Ass’n of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Att’y Gen.
New Jersey.23 Section V analyzes then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller
II, arguing that his historical approach is superior to either form of heightened
scrutiny.24 Section VI argues that, in light of the history and effects of magazine restrictions, a faithful application of the Second Amendment unequivocally means that the Second Amendment protects magazines holding more
than ten rounds.25 Section VII concludes the Note, urging courts to adopt either Justice Kavanaugh’s framework from Heller II or the Ninth Circuit
panel’s reasoning from Duncan when deciding magazine capacity restriction
cases.26
II.
A.

HISTORY OF SECOND AMENDMENT LAW

District of Columbia v. Heller: Application of History

Heller I is the seminal case in Second Amendment law.27 In Heller I, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized the Second Amendment as an
individual right rather than a collective right tied to militia service.28 The Heller I Court grounded its reasoning in the history of the Second Amendment,29
focusing especially on how ordinary members of the public would have understood the Second Amendment at the time of its ratification.30 Importantly,
the Court held that the Second Amendment was not understood to confer a
new right but rather to recognize a preexisting right inherited from English
law.31
To fully understand the Second Amendment as law, one must examine
English history. The roots of the English right to bear arms are planted in
classical Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as the English experience

22. See infra Section III.
23. See infra Section IV.
24. See infra Section V.
25. See infra Section VI.
26. See infra Section VII.
27. See District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
28. Id. at 592.
29. Id. at 592–95; see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1047.
30. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 576 (“[W]e are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”) (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
31. Id. at 592–93.

2022]

LARGE-CAPACITY MAGAZINE BANS

455

under oppressive rulers.32 For the sake of brevity, this Note will focus on the
English experience.
After a string of Catholic monarchs systematically disarmed much of
Protestant England, the monarchs William and Mary declared that no English
Protestant would be denied the right to possess arms for defense.33 This promise was later codified in the English Bill of Rights.34 It was this codified promise that was “the predecessor to our Second Amendment[,]”35 and Sir William
Blackstone considered it among the fundamental rights of Englishmen by
1765.36 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone described
the right as the individual “‘right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence [sic].’”37
As Englishmen, the American colonists believed they too possessed this
fundamental right to keep arms.38 In fact, when King George III began confiscating their arms, many colonists said that the Crown had violated “a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves.”39 Early American
legal commentaries associated the right to bear arms with personal self-defense, not just defense of the community.40 One commentator stated that “the
‘right of self-preservation’ . . . permit[s] a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’
when ‘the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury.’”41

32. LES ADAMS, THE SECOND AMENDMENT PRIMER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDEBOOK TO THE
HISTORY, SOURCES, AND AUTHORITIES FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 20 (1996) (“Stephen Halbrook . . . expresses it this way: ‘The two categorical imperatives of the Second Amendment . . . derive from the classical philosophical texts
concerning the experiences of ancient Greece and Rome and seventeenth-century England. . .
. In this sense, the people’s right to have their own arms was based on the philosophical and
political writings of the greatest intellectuals of the past two thousand years.’”) (quoting
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT 8 (1984)).
33. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593; see also Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir.
2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).
34. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 593.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 593–94 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 136, 139–40 (1765)).
37. Id. at 594 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 140).
38. Id. at 593–94.
39. Id. at 594 (quoting A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Apr. 13,
1769), in BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 1768–1769 AS REVEALED IN A JOURNAL OF THE TIMES
79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936) (reprinted 1970)).
40. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595.
41. Id. (quoting 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 145–46, n.42
(1803)).
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The historical record indicates that the English right to bear arms was
understood to be an individual right at the time of the American founding.42
When the founders drafted the Second Amendment, the public would have
understood it within this context.43 The Supreme Court in Heller I recognized
this, stating that “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and
bear arms.”44
However, the Heller I Court held that the right to bear arms is not unlimited.45 The Court stated that a weapon must not be unusual and must be in
common use for lawful purposes in order to qualify for Second Amendment
protections.46 The “common use” requirement is rooted in the 1939 case
United States v. Miller, which noted that militiamen in the founding era were
“expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in
common use at the time.”47
The Miller articulation of the “common use” requirement requires defining the phrases “in common use” and “at the time.” Heller I indicates that the
“time” in question is the modern era.48 The Heller I Court clearly stated that
the Second Amendment is not limited to founding era technology. 49 It also
cited modern ownership statistics in deciding that handguns are commonly
used for self-defense within the home.50 These holdings considered together
indicate that the proper reference point for common use analysis is the present.51
However, the meaning of “common use” is much less clear.52 In Heller
I, Justice Scalia wrote that the Second Amendment was designed to protect
“the sorts of lawful weapons” citizens possessed.53 Defining “in common use”
42. Id.; see also ADAMS, supra note 32, at 66–67 (arguing that the Second Amendment
was intended to, and still does, protect a right to bear arms both for common defense and individual defense).
43. ADAMS, supra note 32, at 69–71 (quoting Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09
(1925)) (“The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to
the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted.”).
44. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595.
45. Id. at 626; see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1048.
46. Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Heller I, 554
U.S. at 624) (summarizing the factors from Heller I).
47. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)); see also Colvin, supra note 8, at
1045.
48. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582, 628–29; see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1049–50.
49. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582.
50. Id. at 628–29.
51. See Meeus, supra note 2, at 37; see also Duncan, 970 F.3d 1133, 1146–47 (9th Cir.
2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).
52. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1050.
53. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627.
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with reference to “lawful weapons” does not provide lower courts with much
guidance, especially since Second Amendment cases are almost always litigated over a law presuming to make a weapon unlawful.54 Besides, the “common use” paradigm could allow legislatures to proactively ban new weapons
technology to keep them out of “common use.”55 Generally, lower courts have
framed the “common use” standard with reference to use for self-defense,
which Heller I recognized as part of the “core” of the Second Amendment.56
B.

The Second Amendment Incorporated

In 2010, the Supreme Court heard another landmark Second Amendment
case: McDonald v. City of Chicago.57 In this case, the Court incorporated the
right to bear arms to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.58 While Heller I had recognized the Second Amendment
as an individual right, the Court’s holding resolved Second Amendment law
only with respect to federal action.59 The McDonald Court found that the Second Amendment was so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process bound state and
local governments to follow it.60 The McDonald Court did not lay out any new
framework for interpreting the Second Amendment: it simply affirmed Heller
I’s reasoning and incorporated it to apply to state and local governments.61
C.

Circuit-Crafted Balancing: United States v. Marzzarella and its Mirrors

Since Heller I and McDonald, most lower courts have analyzed Second
Amendment cases using a framework first crafted in United States v. Marzzarella.62 There, the court laid out a two-pronged test, first determining
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the

54. See Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle I), 910 F.3d
106, 116, 116 n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]eapons illegal at the time of a lawsuit would not be (or
at least should not be) in common use and yet still may be entitled to protection.”); Kolbe v.
Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–36 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing potential ambiguities in the phrase
“common use”).
55. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1051.
56. Id. at 1050–52 (citing Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After
Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1143 (2011)).
57. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
58. Id. at 775–78; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
59. District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 627–28 (2008); see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1052.
60. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
61. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791; see Colvin, supra note 8, at 1054.
62. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Colvin, supra note 8, at 1057.
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scope of the Second Amendment . . . .” 63 If not, the court’s inquiry would
conclude, but if so, the court would “evaluate the law under some form of
means-end scrutiny.”64 Courts have disagreed over which standard of scrutiny
to apply in Second Amendment cases, particularly those involving magazine
restrictions.65
III.

“WHAT IS A MAGAZINE?” RELEVANT HISTORY OF THE TECHNOLOGY

Though many may think of periodicals rather than firearms when they
hear the word “magazine,” the word has been associated with weapons technology far longer than publishing.66 In the context of firearms, a magazine is
a device that holds ammunition and feeds it into a weapon.67 Modern firearm
magazines are either fixed, most commonly as a tube attached under the gun’s
barrel, or removable, most commonly as a metallic box inserted under the
firearm’s action.68
The number of rounds a magazine holds varies based on the magazine’s
design, the caliber69 of round it holds, the type of firearm it attaches to, and
the user’s preference. For example, both the Mossberg 500 pump action 12
gauge shotgun and the Marlin Model 60 .22 caliber rifle have fixed tubular
magazines.70 However, the Mossberg’s standard magazine only holds six
shotshells while the Marlin’s holds fourteen .22 caliber rounds.71 The Ruger
10/22, another common .22 rifle, has removable box magazines ranging in
size from the standard ten rounds up to 110.72 The most common variants of

63. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
64. Id.
65. See generally Robert B. McNeill II, Note, Second Amendment Jurisprudence: Challenges, Background, and Current Issues, 43 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 185, 196 (2019); Colvin,
supra note 8, at § II.
66. See Magazine, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1828, http://webstersdictionary1828.com
/Dictionary/Magazine (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (stating that the first English periodical
called a “magazine” was not published until 1731).
67. Kyle Wintersteen, 9 Commonly Misused Gun Terms, GUNS & AMMO (Nov. 21, 2018)
https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/9-misused-gun-terms/249625.
68. Id.
69. “Caliber is the nominal bore diameter of a firearm. It is measured in inches or millimeters. The term also applies to the diameter of a bullet.” Alice Jones Webb, What is Caliber?,
THE LODGE (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.ammunitiontogo.com/lodge/what-is-caliber/.
70. See Mike Ramientas, Mossberg 500 Series: A Complete Analysis, GUN NEWS DAILY
https://gunnewsdaily.com/mossberg-500-series-review/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2022); see also
Model 60SB, MARLIN FIREARMS, https://www.marlinfirearms.com/rimfire/model-60/model60sb (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
71. Ramientas, supra note 70; Model 60SB, supra note 70.
72. Alex Joseph, The Ultimate Survival Rifle: Ruger 10/22, GUN NEWS DAILY,
https://gunnewsdaily.com/ruger-10-22-rifle/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
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the Glock nine-millimeter handgun, perhaps the most popular handgun in
America,73 come standard with a fifteen-round magazine.74
A.

Magazine Fed Firearms Predate the United States

Despite popular perception, the founding generation knew of firearm
magazines holding more than ten rounds.75 The first magazine-fed flintlock
repeater was invented in the early 1600s in Florence, Italy.76 In the American
colonies, gunsmith John Shaw made a twelve-shot, magazine-fed repeater in
Boston during the 1750s.77 Various gunsmiths produced these repeaters in the
United States up until 1849.78 These repeaters existed in addition to the multitude of other multi-shot firearms in existence at the time that used multiple
barrels loaded with individual ball and powder loads instead of a magazine.79
B.

Self-Contained Cartridge Made Magazines Holding More Than Ten
Rounds Ubiquitous

Modern self-contained cartridges made magazine-fed firearms standard
in the industry.80 These cartridges with the powder, bullet, and primer in one
unit first appeared in 1846 and were “almost universal” in firearms by 1870.81
Consequently, modern firearms holding as many as twenty to thirty-two
rounds have been in widespread use by the American public since at least the
late 1890s.82 For example, the Winchester M1866, a lever-action with a

73. Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th
Cir. 2021) (citing PAUL M. BARRETT, GLOCK: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S GUN (2012)).
74. Mike Ramientas, Handgun Showdown Round 7: Glock 19 Gen 3 vs. Glock 19 Gen 4,
GUN NEWS DAILY, https://gunnewsdaily.com/glock-19-gen-3-vs-glock-19-gen-4/ (last visited
Jan. 6, 2022).
75. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1147; see also Chris Eger, This Repeater Predates the Constitution, and It’s Not the Only One That Did, GUNS (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.guns.com/news/2018/03/06/this-repeater-predates-the-constitution-and-its-notthe-only-one-that-did-videos.
76. Richard C. Rattenbury, Repeating Rifle, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/technology/repeating-rifle (last revised Feb. 20, 2015).
77. Eger, supra note 75; see also Rattenbury, supra note 76.
78. Cookson Volitional Repeating Flintlock, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N MUSEUMS,
http://www.nramuseum.org/the-museum/the-galleries/the-road-to-american-liberty/case-22the-paper-cartridge/cookson-volitional-repeating-flintlock.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
79. Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209
(9th Cir. 2021); see also Rattenbury, supra note 76.
80. Rattenbury, supra note 76.
81. Sam Bocetta, The Complete History of Small Arms Ammunition and Cartridges,
SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 15, 2017, 2:54 AM), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complete-history-small-arms-ammunition-and-cartridges.
82. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1148.
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seventeen-round magazine, became incredibly popular in the civilian market
after the Civil War.83
IV.

THE DEVELOPING DISAGREEMENT ON MAGAZINE BANS

While there have been several challenges to city and state laws limiting
magazine capacity,84 two recent cases challenging California’s and New Jersey’s respective bans are especially illustrative of the developing law.85 Plaintiffs in Duncan v. Becerra86 challenged California’s magazine capacity restriction, and plaintiffs in Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen.
N.J. (hereinafter N.J. Rifle II)87 challenged New Jersey’s restriction. The California and New Jersey statutes are very similar, both banning the importation,
manufacture, sale, and possession of LCMs.88 Both require citizens in possession of LCMs to either modify them to hold only ten rounds, remove them
from the state, or transfer them to law enforcement or a licensed firearms
dealer before a set date.89 Both prescribe criminal penalties for non-compliance.90
Despite the similarity of these two bans, the Duncan panel and the Third
Circuit in NJ Rifle II came to very different conclusions on the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to LCM bans.91 The Duncan panel applied strict
scrutiny and held that California’s ban was unconstitutional, further determining that the law would still fail under intermediate scrutiny.92 In contrast, the
Third Circuit held that New Jersey’s ban survived under intermediate scrutiny.93 With such divergent conclusions on similar statutes, these opinions
provide an ideal lens through which to examine Second Amendment law as
applied to magazine restrictions.

83. Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown For Gun Safety in Support of Appellees, at 9,
Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (2015) (No. 5:13-cv-05807).
84. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d
991, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244,
1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
85. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th
Cir. 2021); Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 974 F.3d 237 (3d Cir.
2020).
86. 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).
87. 974 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020).
88. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310 (2016); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1(y),
2C:39-3(j) (2020).
89. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j).
90. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j).
91. Compare Duncan, 970 F.3d 1133, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209
(9th Cir. 2021), with N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 243.
92. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1164–65.
93. N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 243.
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Duncan v. Becerra and The Ninth Circuit Three-Judge Panel Decision

As stated previously, the Duncan v. Becerra three-judge panel decision
was vacated when the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.94 However, this panel’s reasoning was the best of any circuit-level opinion on this
topic to date. This three-judge panel fully analyzed the threshold question of
whether a magazine ban implicated Second Amendment interests, whereas
most other circuits have merely “assumed without deciding” that it did.95 Furthermore, the panel correctly applied strict scrutiny to the magazine ban issue,
noting fatal flaws in other circuits’ formulation of intermediate scrutiny.96 For
these reasons, the panel decision is still relevant. From this point forward, any
analysis or reference to Duncan will refer to the three-judge panel opinion,
not the later en banc opinion.97
The Duncan Plaintiffs filed suit against California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, challenging the constitutionality of California Penal Code §
32310.98 When first enacted in 2000, the law barred the sale, manufacture, and
importation of new magazines holding more than ten rounds, but not the possession of existing ones.99 California amended the law in 2013 to criminalize
purchasing or receiving LCM holding more than ten rounds but still allowed
anyone who had previously legally purchased one to retain it.100
That changed in 2016 when the California legislature again amended
Cal. Penal Code §32310, this time prohibiting any possession of an LCM,
regardless of when the owner previously acquired it.101 That same year, California voters approved Proposition 63 that increased the penalty for possession of an LCM to up to a misdemeanor fine of $100 and/or one year in jail.102
The law gave Californians until July 1, 2017 to either “(1) Remove the largecapacity magazine from the state; (2) Sell the large-capacity magazine to a
licensed firearms dealer . . . (3) Surrender the large-capacity magazine to a
law enforcement agency for destruction[,]” or permanently modify it to hold
only ten rounds.103

94. 970 F.3d 1133, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021); see
supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
95. Compare Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1145–52; N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 243; Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1260–61 (D.C. Cir. 2011), with Duncan v. Bonta,
19 F.4th 1087, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2021).
96. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1158–59, 1162–64.
97. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
98. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1141–42; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310.
99. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1141.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1142.
102. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310(c).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310(d); see Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1142.

462

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
granted the Duncan plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement
two days before the law took effect.104 The State filed an interlocutory appeal,
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
injunction.105 However, before the Court of Appeals ruled on that appeal, the
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment before the District Court.106 The District Court granted the motion, finding Cal. Penal Code § 23120 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.107 The State appealed this
final decision to the Ninth Circuit, leading to the three-judge panel decision.108
1.

First Prong on the Ninth Circuit Marzzarella Style Test: Are Second Amendment Rights Implicated?

The Duncan panel applied the Ninth Circuit’s Marzzarella style twoprong test to determine whether California’s LCM ban violated the Second
Amendment.109 The Ninth Circuit’s formulation of this test requires courts
first to determine whether the statute in question regulates Second Amendment-protected conduct.110 If it does, the court will determine whether to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny.111
a.

Question one: Does the law regulate protected “arms”?

Looking at the first prong of the Marzzarella test, the Duncan panel
asked four questions to determine whether a challenged statute burdens the
Second Amendment.112 First, the court asked “whether the law regulates
‘arms’ for purposes of the Second Amendment.”113 The Duncan court held
that “[f]irearm magazines are ‘arms’ under the Second Amendment[]” since
a firearm would be useless for its intended purpose without one.114 As the
court put it, “a regulation cannot permissibly ban a protected firearm’s components critical to its operation.”115
104. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1139–40 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
105. Duncan v. Becerra, 742 F.App’x 218, 220 (9th Cir. 2018).
106. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1143.
107. Duncan, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1186.
108. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1143.
109. Id. at 1145; see supra Section II.C.
110. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1145.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1146.
115. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)). Importantly, the Duncan panel also cited to the Third Circuit case analyzed in this Note, N.J. Rifle
I. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146 (citing Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J.
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Question two: Is the weapon dangerous or unusual?

The second question of the first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s Marzzarella
style test is whether the arm in question is dangerous or unusual, a standard
laid out in Heller I.116 The Duncan panel emphasized that “dangerous and
unusual” are elements, not factors, quoting Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring
opinion in Caetano v. Massachusetts: “‘[a] weapon may not be banned unless
it is both dangerous and unusual.’”117 Also, if a weapon is “commonly used
today for lawful purposes[,]” it is not unusual and may not be excluded from
Second Amendment protection.118 The court noted that the question of commonality, though relying heavily on statistics, cannot be purely statistical,
since a law outlawing certain arms would necessarily make that arm less common.119
Using this framework, the Duncan panel found that LCMs are in common use for lawful purposes and thus are not dangerous or unusual.120 The
panel stated that not only do “nearly half of all magazines in the United States
today hold more than ten rounds of ammunition[,]” but magazines of this size
“have been in existence—and owned by American citizens—for centuries.”121
According to the Duncan panel, this longstanding history, combined with the
overwhelming number of LCMs currently in circulation, went well “beyond
what is necessary under Heller [I].”122

(N.J. Rifle I), 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018)). There, the Third Circuit found that magazines
are Second Amendment protected arms. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116 (“Because magazines feed
ammunition into certain guns, and ammunition is necessary for such a gun to function as intended, magazines are ‘arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment.”) Id. However,
the Third Circuit implied that LCMs belong to a separate sub-class of magazines, potentially
leaving them open to regulation. Id. (“First, we consider whether the regulation of a specific
type of magazine, namely an LCM, ‘imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of
the Second Amendment’s guarantee.’”). Id. Ultimately, the Third Circuit left the issue undecided, choosing to “assume without deciding” that LCMs are Second Amendment protected
arms and moving on to the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. at 117. The Duncan
three-judge panel agreed with the Third Circuit that magazines are bearable arms protected by
the Second Amendment but did not agree that a magazine’s capacity can put it into a separate
sub-class of arms that can be regulated differently. Compare Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133,
1146 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021), with N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at
116–17. See also infra Section IV.A.1.b.
116. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146; see also District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S.
570, 627 (2008).
117. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146 (quoting from Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 417
(2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
118. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1147–48.
119. Id. at 1147 (citing N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116 n.15).
120. Id.
121. Id. See infra Section III.
122. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1147.

464

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW
c.

[Vol. 44

Question three: Is the regulation longstanding?

The third question under the first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s Marzzarella style test is whether the regulation in question is longstanding.123 A
longstanding regulation is presumptively constitutional.124 The Ninth Circuit
has found that a regulation must date back to the “founding-era or Reconstruction-era” to be longstanding.125
The Ninth Circuit noted that neither Cal. Penal Code § 21320 nor any
other magazine size restriction dates back to these eras.126 The earliest a state
passed a magazine size restriction was during the Prohibition era, and all laws
(but D.C.’s) from that era were repealed over the next fifty years.127
d.

Question four: Is there any historical evidence that the right
in question falls outside the Second Amendment?

The fourth and final question the Ninth Circuit asks for the first prong of
its Marzzarella style test is “whether there is any persuasive historical evidence in the record showing that the regulation affects rights that fall outside
the scope of the Second Amendment.”128 The Duncan panel dealt with this
question rather quickly, noting that the historical analysis from the previously
discussed questions revealed that no such evidence existed.129 Having answered this and the previous questions, the panel held that Cal. Penal Code §
21320 did burden protected Second Amendment conduct.130
2.

Second Prong of the Marzzarella Style Test in the Ninth Circuit:
Determining and Applying the Correct Level of Scrutiny
a.

Choosing strict over intermediate scrutiny

For the second prong of the Marzzarella test, the Duncan panel determined the appropriate standard of scrutiny.131 Ninth Circuit precedent requires
the court to apply strict scrutiny if a regulation substantially burdens the
“core” of the Second Amendment, defined in Heller I as self-defense within
123. Id. at 1149.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1150.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle I), 910
F.3d 106, 117 n.18 (3d Cir. 2018) (“LCMs were not regulated until the 1920s, but most of those
laws were invalidated by the 1970s.”).
128. Id. at 1145.
129. Id. at 1151.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1152.
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the home.132 Since the statute at issue banned the ownership of LCMs for all
Californians, even within the home, the panel found that it did implicate core
Second Amendment rights.133 Furthermore, the law burdened those rights substantially since it categorically banned protected arms.134 In light of this, the
Ninth Circuit held that strict scrutiny was appropriate.135
b.

Applying strict scrutiny and critiquing intermediate scrutiny

Applying strict scrutiny, the panel found that the State’s interest in reducing violence was compelling, but the LCM ban was not narrowly tailored
to advance that interest.136 The Court emphasized the fact that this was a blanket ban on possession, referring to Heller I’s decision that a blanket ban on a
class of protected arms was unconstitutional.137
The panel went further, though, arguing that California’s ban on LCMs
would be unconstitutional even under intermediate scrutiny.138 It accused
other Circuits of applying a “watered down” form of intermediate scrutiny
that more closely resembled rational basis review, noting that intermediate
scrutiny should have “bite” and requires a “healthy dose of skepticism” as to
the challenged law’s constitutionality.139 With this in mind, the panel held that
California’s ban was not reasonably targeted at the important governmental
interest of public safety, emphasizing that the State relied on “remarkably
thin” evidence that banning LCMs would have any effect on public safety.140
In other words, the mere assertion that some of these magazines would be
misused cannot justify “restrict[ing] the people’s liberties under the guise of
protecting them.”141
B.

Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. and The Third
Circuit

In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld New Jersey’s similar ban on LCMs.142 The
132. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
133. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1152.
134. Id. at 1156.
135. Id. at 1164.
136. Id. at 1164–65.
137. Id. at 1164; see also District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 629
(2008).
138. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1165.
139. Id. at 1166.
140. Id. at 1168.
141. Id.
142. See Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d
237, 243 (3d Cir. 2020).
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Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. (“ANJRPC”) filed suit
in 2018 on behalf of its members challenging N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1(y)
and 2C:39-3(j).143 Passed that same year, § 2C:39-1(y) defined any magazines
holding more than ten rounds as “large capacity ammunition magazine[s.]”144
Section 2C:39-3(j) made possession of these magazines a crime of the fourth
degree,145 which is a felony equivalent.146 The law gave New Jersey residents
until December 10, 2018 to either modify their LCMs to hold only ten rounds,
register any weapons that could not be modified, or transfer their magazines
or firearm to law enforcement or a registered dealer.147 Prior to this, New Jersey had already banned all magazines holding more than fifteen rounds––this
law simply lowered the cap to ten.148
The plaintiffs argued that the law violated not just their Second Amendment rights but their Fifth Amendment right to just compensation and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.149 They filed a motion for preliminary
injunction to enjoin enforcement of the law pending litigation on the merits.150
The District Court denied the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.151
On appeal, the Third Circuit went beyond the question before it on the
motion and held in a two-to-one panel decision that the plaintiffs’ case failed
on the merits.152 The Third Circuit applied the two-prong balancing test from
Marzzarella, the case from which the doctrine originated.153
1.

First Prong of Marzzarella: Are Second Amendment Rights Implicated?

The first prong of the Marzzarella test requires the court to determine
“whether the type of arm at issue is commonly owned . . . and ‘typically
143. Id. at 241.
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1(y).
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(j).
146. See What is a Fourth Degree Crime in New Jersey?, THE TORMEY LAW FIRM, LLC.,
https://www.morristowncriminallaw.com/fourth-degree-crimes-in-new-jersey-penalties/ (“A
fourth degree crime is an indictable offense in New Jersey, often called a felony. In other states
there are misdemeanors and felonies but in New Jersey we have disorderly persons offenses
and indictable crimes. . . . [A] fourth degree crime is the least serious of the [indictable
crimes].”) (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
147. Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237,
241 (3d Cir. 2020).
148. Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle I), 910 F.3d 106,
126 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 243.
152. Id. at 243 (citing N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 110).
153. See N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116.

2022]

LARGE-CAPACITY MAGAZINE BANS

467

possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’”154 The court admitted that LCMs are commonly owned and used for lawful purposes like “hunting and pest control” and “self-defense.”155 The court also held that magazines
generally are protected arms within the meaning of the Second Amendment
and that banning magazines, including LCMs, burdened Second Amendment
interests.156
Despite these findings the court chose not to hold that LCMs are protected arms.157 The court speculated that LCMs might be distinguishable from
magazines as a whole, potentially removing their protection.158 However, the
court did not rule on this prong of the test, instead it “assum[ed] without deciding” that LCMs are protected and moved on to choice of scrutiny.159
2.

Second Prong of Marzzarella: Determining and Applying the Correct Level of Scrutiny
a.

Choosing intermediate scrutiny

Having assumed that magazines are protected arms, the court moved on
to the second prong of the Marzzarella test: choosing and applying the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.160 A court will apply either strict scrutiny
if the law burdens the “core” of the Second Amendment or intermediate scrutiny if the law does not.161 The Third Circuit limits the “core” of the Second
Amendment to only the scenario explicitly dealt with in Heller I, self-defense
within the home.162
Under this framework, the N.J. Rifle I court held that New Jersey’s ban
did not implicate the “core of the Second Amendment.”163 The court reasoned
that:
(1) it does not categorically ban a class of firearms but is rather a ban on a
subset of magazines; (2) it is not a prohibition of a class of arms overwhelmingly chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home; (3) it does
not disarm or substantially affect Americans’ ability to defend themselves;
(4) New Jersey residents can still possess and use magazines, just with
fewer rounds; and (5) it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in
154. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554
U.S. 570, 625 (2008)) (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 90–91 (3d Cir. 2010)).
155. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 112.
156. Id. at 116; N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 241.
157. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116–17.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 117.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 117.
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the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all circumstances. By this rationale, any type of firearm possessed in the home
would be protected merely because it could be used for self-defense.164

The Third Circuit thus found intermediate scrutiny appropriate.165
b.

False intermediate scrutiny: Rational basis in disguise

The N.J. Rifle I court found that New Jersey’s ban reasonably fit the important state interest of public safety.166 The court reasoned that banning all
magazines holding more than ten rounds could give victims more opportunities to escape or fight back if a mass shooter pauses to reload.167 The court
noted several shootings where the perpetrator was restrained or potential victims escaped during a pause caused by either the perpetrator reloading or the
firearm malfunctioning.168 Since the court believed that core Second Amendment rights were not implicated by New Jersey’s ban and that potentially increasing delays in a shooting could protect public safety, it upheld the prohibition, reasoning that it was “reasonably related” to public safety.169
However, the majority did not apply true intermediate scrutiny.170 Instead, as noted by Circuit Judge Bibas in his dissent and by the Duncan panel,
the Third Circuit majority used a “watered-down” version of review much
closer to the rational basis test.171 Judge Bibas noted that the majority relied
on expert testimony that even the District Court stated was “‘of little help.’”172
The majority decided the case on only this unhelpful evidence combined with
additional anecdotes.173 As Judge Bibas stated, this “watered down” version
of intermediate scrutiny “flips the burden of proof onto the challengers, treating both contested evidence and the lack of evidence as conclusively favoring
the government.”174

164. Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237,
243 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
165. Id.
166. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 119.
167. Id. at 120.
168. Id. The cited examples include the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, the Navy Yard shooting,
the Arizona shooting targeting Gabby Giffords, as well as others. Id.
169. Id. at 120, 122.
170. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 126 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
171. Id.; Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d at 1166–67 (“Whatever its precise contours might
be, intermediate scrutiny cannot approximate the deference of rational basis review. Heller
forecloses any such notion.”).
172. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 126 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ass’n of N.J. Rifle &
Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Grewal, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167698 at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018)).
173. See id.
174. Id.
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Indeed, the majority opinion in N.J. Rifle I reads like an application of a
rational basis review. Its basic chain of logic could be summarized as follows:
The State has an important interest in protecting public safety. Reducing magazine capacity might cause mass shooters to pause more often during a shooting. Though there is notably little evidence to support this claim, some reasonable legislator could conclude that more pauses might save some lives during a shooting. Therefore, the ban is reasonably related to the important public
interest.175
This analysis takes classic rational basis logic and dresses it in the vocabulary of intermediate scrutiny, since it “does not insist that such a connection exist in fact, but only that the legislature could reasonably have believed
that there was such a connection.”176 If the words “important interest” and
“reasonably related” were replaced with “legitimate interest” and “rationally
related,” respectively, one would hardly notice the difference. The Third Circuit should have required the State to submit more convincing evidence to
justify the reasonableness of its ban.177
3.

Subsequent History of N.J. Rifle

Since the N.J. Rifle I decision was on a motion for preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit remanded the case back to the district court.178 The
district court, bound by the circuit panel’s decision on the merits, granted
summary judgment to the State.179 The plaintiffs appealed this ruling, but a
second Third Circuit panel found that the prior panel had jurisdiction to decide
the case on its merits and upheld the earlier ruling.180 One dissenting judge
disagreed, noting that the prior panel did not fully apply the Marzzarella
test.181
V.

A THIRD APPROACH: TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION

As exemplified in both Duncan and N.J. Rifle I and II, many Circuit
Courts of Appeals that have dealt with magazine capacity restrictions have
engaged in some form of interest balancing test, applying either strict, intermediate, or some different level of scrutiny called by one of those names. 182
175. See N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 119–20.
176. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court From the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 359 (1999).
177. See N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 126–27 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
178. Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237,
240 (3d Cir. 2020).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 245–47.
181. Id. at 248 (Matey, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 126 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
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However, a non-interest balancing approach would be the most consistent
with the Heller I decision.183 In his dissent in Heller I, Justice Breyer advocated for an interest balancing framework similar to intermediate scrutiny.184
The majority explicitly rejected this proposal, stating that the affected rights
should instead be analyzed in light of the “historical tradition” of the Constitution and firearm regulations.185 Despite this clear directive, most courts have
applied an interest balancing test based on the Third Circuit’s formulation in
Marzzarella.186
However, at least one United States district court and a growing number
of scholars have rejected the use of interest balancing tests on Second Amendment issues altogether, noting the Heller Court’s rejection of it.187 Those with
this view lean heavily on then-D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent
in Heller II.188
After the Supreme Court decided Heller I in 2008, D.C. enacted sweeping new gun regulations in response189 These regulations included mandatory
registration of handguns (but no blanket ban) as well as a ban on possession
of LCMs, among other prohibitions.190 Since the D.C. law prohibited possession and sale of LCMs, it is comparable to California’s ban considered in
Duncan and New Jersey’s ban considered in N.J. Rifle.191
The majority in Heller II upheld D.C.’s ban on magazines holding more
than ten rounds.192 The court, like many others, applied a Marzzarella style
balancing test.193 Despite admitting, that it was “clear enough” that LCMs and
semi-automatic rifles were in common use, much like the Third Circuit would
later admit in N.J. Rifle II,194 the court declined to specifically hold that they
183. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
184. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would simply adopt such
an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.”).
185. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–35, 689.
186. See Meeus, supra note 2, at 48; see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,
90–91 (3d Cir. 2010).
187. See Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see,
e.g., Colvin, supra note 8, at 1059; Gallo, supra note 17, at 540–41; Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–
35.
188. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1044; see Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
189. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Firearms Registration
Amendment Act, 2008 D.C. Sess. L. Serv. Law 17–372 (West)).
190. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1248–49; Firearms Registration Amendment Act, 2008 D.C.
Sess. L. Serv. Law 17–372 (West).
191. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1141–42; CAL. PENAL CODE § 32310; N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d
at 241; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1.
192. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264.
193. Id. at 1252–53.
194. See supra Section IV.B.
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were.195 In the court’s judgment, deciding that question explicitly was unnecessary since intermediate scrutiny was appropriate and the prohibition survived that level of scrutiny.196
Judge Kavanaugh dissented, reasoning that the court’s use of the Marzzarella balancing test was incompatible with Supreme Court decisions Heller
I and McDonald.197 He noted that the Heller Court had set forth “precise guidance” that Second Amendment cases should instead be analyzed in light of
the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second Amendment.198
Kavanaugh did not address D.C.’s ban on magazines holding more than
ten rounds, choosing instead to focus on the semi-automatic rifle ban and gun
registration requirements.199 Kavanaugh noted that, even on First Amendment
issues, the Supreme Court does not use balancing tests when considering bans
on “categories of speech.”200 Kavanaugh stated that D.C.’s assault weapons
ban is a ban on a category of arms, similar to a category of speech.201
On top of this, he noted that the Heller I Court specifically denounced
the use of balancing tests.202 While the Supreme Court did not explicitly denounce intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis, it did scrupulously avoid using
any heightened scrutiny language.203 Kavanaugh noted that the Heller I Court
made no mention whatsoever of any “compelling” or even “important” interests.204 Instead, the Court simply found that the regulation at issue was not
traditional or longstanding and that the weapon being regulated was in common use for lawful purposes.205 In fact, Kavanaugh noted that even when the
Heller I Court approved of regulations on short-barreled shotguns and fully
automatic firearms,206 it “made no mention of strict or intermediate scrutiny .
. . . Rather, the test the Court relied on—as it indicated by using terms such
as ‘historical tradition’ and ‘longstanding’ and ‘historical justifications’—was
one of text, history, and tradition.”207
195. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1276–80 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1271.
199. Id. at 1269.
200. Id. at 1283.
201. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1273.
203. Id. at 1273 n.5.
204. Id. at 1271, 1273.
205. Id.
206. For clarity, fully automatic firearms, also called “machine guns,” are firearms that fire
continuously as long as the shooter holds the trigger down. In contrast, semi-automatic weapons, like the so-called “assault weapons” D.C. was trying to regulate in this case, only fire one
round each time the trigger is pulled. See generally Robyn Sandoval, Semi-Auto vs. Full-Auto,
A GIRL & A GUN (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.agirlandagun.org/semi-auto-vs-full-auto/.
207. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1273 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Kavanaugh cites to and
quotes from various scholarly works to support this point. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,
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Judge Kavanaugh further said that the Marzzarella two-pronged test
used by the majority was inconsistent with Heller I since it “subjects the individual right to balancing under the intermediate scrutiny test.”208 As Kavanaugh noted, the Supreme Court foreclosed such a route when it rejected
Justice Breyer’s proposed test, in which he “explicitly referred to intermediate
scrutiny and relied on cases such as Turner Broadcasting that had applied
intermediate scrutiny.”209 Judge Kavanaugh also pointed to McDonald v. City
of Chicago where the Supreme Court reiterated its rejection of balancing.210
He noted that the McDonald Court “expressly rejected judicial assessment of
‘the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions’ and stated that courts applying
the Second Amendment thus would not have to make ‘difficult empirical
judgments’ about the efficacy of particular gun regulations.”211
Using the “text, history, and tradition” method, Judge Kavanaugh opined
that D.C.’s ban on assault rifles was unconstitutional.212 Not only have semiautomatic rifles not traditionally been banned, but they are also in common
use for lawful purposes.213 Following the precedent laid out in Heller I, D.C.’s
outright ban of semi-automatic rifles was thus unconstitutional.214 Judge Kavanaugh did not, however, address D.C.’s magazine ban, and no court has yet
applied this framework in a magazine capacity restriction case.215
VI.

ARGUING FOR JUDGE KAVANAUGH’S FRAMEWORK AND ANALYZING
MAGAZINE BANS UNDER “TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION” AND
MARZZARELLA

Of the interpretive frameworks analyzed in this Note, Judge Kavanaugh’s is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the text of
the Second Amendment. As he noted, the Supreme Court has twice rejected

Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1463 (2009) (“Absent here is any inquiry
into whether the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest in preventing death
and crime, though handgun ban proponents did indeed argue that such bans are necessary to
serve those interests and that no less restrictive alternative would do the job.”); Joseph Blocher,
Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375, 405 (2009) (stating that the Heller case “neither requires nor permits any balancing beyond that accomplished by the Framers themselves.”).
208. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1276.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1278.
211. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790–91 (2010)).
212. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1269–70 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1287.
214. Id.
215. See generally id.; Colvin, supra note 8, at 1044.
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balancing inquiries when the Second Amendment was implicated.216 Furthermore, the outcome of interest balancing inquiries is likely to vary widely
based on how the judge hearing the case interprets the weight of various interests.217 Kavanaugh’s approach requires there be some evidence outside the
mind of the court on how similar weapons have been regulated historically.218
Even for new weapons technologies, his approach would force courts to “reason by analogy” to existing weapons and traditional regulations.219 While
courts must always utilize their judgment to some extent, Kavanaugh’s approach provides a much more objective framework than the Marzzarella style
test.220 This framework would, in turn, provide greater legal stability and predictability for cases involving fundamental rights guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.221
A.

LCM Bans Under Judge Kavanaugh’s Framework

Under Judge Kavanaugh’s historical, Heller-based framework, blanket
bans on magazines holding more than ten rounds (like California’s and New
Jersey’s) would be unconstitutional. Firearm magazines holding more than
ten rounds and other multi-shot firearms have existed on this continent longer
than our nation.222 Despite the longstanding history of LCMs in North America, there is no longstanding history of regulating firearm magazine capacity.223 States did not begin regulating such magazines until the 1920s, and
every state that did so repealed those laws in less than fifty years.224 While the
federal government briefly banned the sale or manufacture of new large-capacity magazines in 1994, this law expired in 2004 and was not renewed.225
Furthermore, this federal ban on the sale of new LCMs included a grandfather
clause for magazines owned before the ban, making it nowhere near as
216. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1278 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Colvin, supra note 8,
at 1048 (“By engaging in a textual, historical, and traditional method of analysis . . . Heller
also implicitly rejected the application of intermediate or strict scrutiny to prohibition cases.”).
217. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1059.
218. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Colvin, supra note 8,
at 1059.
219. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
220. Colvin, supra note 8, at 1072 (stating that Kavanaugh’s approach “allows the judiciary
to remove personal politics from the equation and simply focus upon long-standing evidence.”).
221. Id. at 1073 (“The Kavanaugh approach . . . goes further towards removing personal
judicial predilection from the analysis of a particular Second Amendment case.”).
222. See supra Section III; see also Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1149 (9th Cir.
2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2021).
223. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1150.
224. Id. (quoting Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle I), 910
F.3d 106, 117 n.18 (3d Cir. 2018).
225. Id.

474

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

expansive as the total bans on possession considered in Duncan, N.J. Rifle,
and Heller II.226
It is clear from these facts that total bans on magazines holding more
than ten rounds could not be called, in any sense, traditional or longstanding
and are thus not presumptively lawful.227 Furthermore, magazines holding
more than ten rounds are incredibly common in America for lawful purposes,
as even the Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit majorities admit.228 Because these
magazines are in common use for lawful purposes and are not traditionally
regulated, any law categorically banning possession of them would be unconstitutional under Kavanaugh’s framework.
B.

Bans on LCMs Still Fail a Marzzarella Test Under Both Forms of
Heightened Scrutiny
1.

Strict Scrutiny is the Appropriate Level of Review Under Marzzarella

If courts still choose to apply a Marzzarella type test in magazine cases,
strict scrutiny is appropriate, and bans like New Jersey’s and California’s will
not survive.229 The panel decision in Duncan v. Becerra is the best-reasoned
application of this balancing test to date.
a.

Prong one: Does the item implicate Second Amendment interests?

On the first prong of the Marzzarella style test, the Duncan panel found
that magazines holding more than ten rounds are not a category unto themselves but are a part of the broader protected class of magazines. 230 As such,
they implicate Second Amendment rights in the same way all magazines do.231
In contrast, the Third Circuit said it “assumed without deciding” that LCMs
are protected arms, while nonetheless treating them as a distinguishable class
that could be banned.232
226. See id. at 1167 (“[G]randfather clauses are ‘important[]’ in reducing burdens generated by a restriction.”).
227. Id. at 1151; Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116–17.
228. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116; see also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (“We think it clear
enough in the record that semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds
are indeed in ‘common use[]’. . .”).
229. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1152; N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 127 (Bibas, J., dissenting).
230. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146.
231. See id. A majority of Circuit Courts have held that magazines are bearable arms within
the meaning of the Second Amendment. See Meeus, supra note 2, at 38.
232. See N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 117–18.
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The Duncan panel’s reasoning is more logical than the Third Circuit’s
arbitrary division of a protected class of arms. After all, what significantly
distinguishes a magazine holding ten rounds from a magazine holding eleven,
or even from one holding sixteen, which New Jersey had already banned?233
As dissenting Judge Matey said in N.J. Rifle II, “The Second Amendment
demands more than back-of-the-envelope math. At a minimum, it asks the
government to explain, to offer but one example, why eleven rounds is too
many while nine remains fine.”234 Avoiding this arbitrary division and treating
all magazines as a protected class of arms within the meaning of the Second
Amendment is the most reasonable position.235
Of course, this leaves the question of whether LCMs are dangerous and
unusual.236 It is worth remembering that this is an elemental test: a bearable
arm must be both dangerous and unusual for a categorical ban on it to be
presumptively lawful.237 However, magazines are not unusual, even those
holding more than ten rounds.238 They are incredibly common and “are overwhelmingly owned and used for lawful purposes[.] . . . the antithesis of unusual.”239 Since magazines holding more than ten rounds are not unusual, categorical bans on them cannot be presumptively lawful under the “dangerous
and unusual” test.240
As discussed previously, magazine capacity restrictions are not
longstanding regulations.241 This means that they are not presumptively lawful by means of tradition either.242 With all this in mind, the answer to the first
prong of a Marzzarella style test must be that magazines, even those holding
more than ten rounds, are protected arms within the meaning of the Second
Amendment.243

233. N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 126 (Bibas, J. dissenting).
234. Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237,
260 (3d Cir. 2020) (Matey, J., dissenting).
235. See id.; Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146.
236. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146.
237. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[A] weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual.”) (emphasis in original).
238. See N.J. Rifle I, 910 F.3d 106, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2018); Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1146–47.
239. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1147.
240. Id. at 1146.
241. See supra Section VI.A.
242. See District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008); see also
Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1149–51.
243. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1151.
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Prong two: What level of scrutiny is appropriate?

The second prong of the Marzzarella style test is choice of scrutiny.244
Blanket restrictions on magazines substantially burden the core of the Second
Amendment: self-defense within the home.245 Under a blanket restriction, citizens would be prohibited from using standard capacity magazines for commonly used self-defense handguns like the Glock, even within their own
homes.246 The sweeping, categorical nature of these laws significantly enhances the burden.247 As the Duncan court put it,
Half of all magazines in the United States are now illegal to own in California. It does not matter that these magazines are not unusual and are used
commonly in guns for self-defense. Law-abiding citizens must alter or
turn them over—or else the government may forcibly confiscate them
from their homes and imprison them up to a year. The law’s prohibitions
apply everywhere in the state and to practically everyone. It offers no
meaningful exceptions at all for law-abiding citizens. These features are
the hallmark of substantial burden.248

Strict scrutiny would be more than appropriate under a Marzzarella style
test.249
2.

Application of Strict Scrutiny to Magazine Bans

Under strict scrutiny, statutes like California’s and New Jersey’s would
fail. Protecting public safety is undoubtedly a compelling interest.250 However, total prohibitions of all magazines holding more than ten rounds are not
narrowly tailored to advance that goal by very nature of their sweeping, indiscriminate effect.251 States must take more care to use the least “drastic
means” of achieving public safety.252

244. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2010).
245. Id. at 1140, 1157 (“[A] law that takes away a substantial portion of arms commonly
used by citizens for self-defense imposes a substantial burden on the Second Amendment.”).
246. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1152. See also supra Section III; supra notes 70–75.
247. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1152.
248. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 1152.
250. Id. at 1164.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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Magazine Bans Also Fail Intermediate Scrutiny

Even if intermediate scrutiny were appropriate, bans like California’s
and New Jersey’s would still fail.253 Undoubtedly, the Government’s interest
in curbing violence is “significant, substantial and important.”254 However,
banning all magazines holding more than ten rounds goes beyond what is
“reasonably necessary” to achieve that end.255 Prohibiting all citizens within
an entire state from possessing constitutionally protected arms is not “tailored” in any sense of the word.256 Evidence that banning large-capacity magazines helps stop mass shootings is scanty at best.257 Courts have consistently
described what little evidence is offered for this purpose as “of little help”258
or “remarkably thin.”259
In contrast, there is evidence that many mass shooters bring multiple
guns to their pre-planned slaughters.260 Bringing multiple guns allows them
to simply switch weapons should their first one run empty or malfunction, a
tactic that is usually faster than a magazine change.261 Meanwhile, self-defenders are likely to have only one firearm on them with only the number of
rounds in one magazine. Even assuming that prospective mass shooters would
not simply acquire banned LCMs illegally, prohibiting possession of magazines over ten rounds would have only a small effect on the deadliness of mass
shootings while severely limiting the capabilities of responsible citizens in
self-defense situations.262
Proponents of LCM bans often argue that magazines over ten rounds are
not necessary because the average self-defense shooting only requires the use
of 2.2 rounds.263 This argument is unconvincing since this statistic is simply
an average: it does not and cannot represent every situation a self-defender
could reasonably face.264 In reality, citizens face a very real chance of needing
more than ten rounds to adequately defend themselves.265 It would be

253. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1165; Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J.
(N.J. Rifle II), 974 F.3d 237, 260 (3d Cir. 2020) (Matey, J., dissenting).
254. N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 260–61 (Matey, J., dissenting).
255. Id.; see Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1167.
256. N.J. Rifle II, 974 F.3d at 260 (Matey, J., dissenting); Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1167.
257. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1168; Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Grewal, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167698, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018).
258. Grewal, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8.
259. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1168.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1160–62.
263. Id. at 1160.
264. Id.
265. Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1160.
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eminently reasonable for a citizen to prepare for that contingency by carrying
a weapon loaded with more than ten rounds.
There are many documented cases of citizens firing a low-capacity
weapon empty without resolving a deadly threat or firing more than ten
rounds in legitimate self-defense. For example, on January 4, 2013, Melinda
Herman defended herself and her two children against a home invader using
a six-shot .38 special revolver.266 When an unidentified man began prying
open the front door with a crowbar, Mrs. Herman took her children through
the upstairs master bedroom and bathroom and hid in their crawl space attic.267
The home invader wasted no time heading upstairs, prying open the
locked master bedroom door, and entering the crawl space.268 When he
opened that door, Mrs. Herman opened fire, striking the invader five times
while missing once.269 With that, she was out of ammunition, and the invader
was still very mobile.270 Fortunately for her and her children, the intruder decided to flee instead of attack.271 Still, he was able to drive his vehicle into
another subdivision before finally wrecking his vehicle and collapsing.272 The
suspect survived and is currently serving a ten-year prison sentence.273
While Mrs. Herman was able to successfully defend herself and her children, had her attacker reacted in any way besides abject terror when shot, the
situation could have ended quite differently. Even after emptying her weapon,
her attacker was still able to leave the house on his own power and drive to
another street before being incapacitated.274 If he had responded with further
violence, Mrs. Herman would have had no functional weapon with which to
defend herself. Having a modern handgun equipped with a fifteen- or seventeen-shot magazine would have been an indispensable necessity in this alternate scenario, as there would have been little to no time for a reload.275
Another self-defense incident demonstrates that even sixteen rounds
may not be enough to immediately incapacitate a single attacker. In 2004,
pizza deliveryman Ron Honeycutt was forced to fire on an armed robber. 276
When the attacker pointed his weapon, Honeycutt drew his handgun, loaded
with sixteen rounds, and fired.277 When his attacker did not fall, Honeycutt
266. CHRIS BIRD, THANK GOD I HAD A GUN: TRUE ACCOUNTS OF SELF-DEFENSE 28 (2014).
267. Id. at 28–29.
268. Id. at 30–31.
269. Id. at 31.
270. Id. at 31–32.
271. Id.
272. BIRD, supra note 266, at 33.
273. Id. at 38.
274. Id. at 33–34.
275. See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 988 F.3d 1209
(9th Cir. 2021).
276. BIRD, supra note 266, at 317.
277. Id. at 320.
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continued firing, hitting his attacker “more than ten times but less than fifteen.”278 Now with an empty gun, Honeycutt was still facing an armed attacker
at point-blank range.279
As Honeycutt was deciding whether to rush the man or retrieve an extra
magazine from his car, the attacker finally collapsed.280 It was later determined that the robber had loaded his weapon’s magazine but had forgotten to
chamber a round.281 If the robber had properly loaded his firearm, Honeycutt
would likely not have survived.282
These examples are far from exhaustive: many more examples of citizens using more than ten rounds for legitimate self-defense exist.283 While it
is true that self-defense incidents like these are not as common as those involving three rounds or less, they do happen. A reasonable armed citizen cannot afford to ignore the genuine possibility that six, ten, or even sixteen rounds
may not stop a deadly threat.284 Prohibiting citizens from owning LCMs
would deprive citizens of that capability, with little real effect on the deadliness of mass shootings.285 Since LCM bans are not well fitted to the stated
government interest, they fail intermediate scrutiny.286
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the future, courts would do well to eschew Marzzarella style balancing tests in Second Amendment cases. The test contravenes explicit Supreme
Court precedent rejecting balancing tests in this area of law.287 Instead, courts
should apply a “text, history, and tradition” approach as then-Circuit Judge
Kavanaugh advocated for in Heller II.288 This test removes a large amount of
subjectivity from legal analysis and comports with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller I and McDonald v. City of Chicago.289
Furthermore, laws prohibiting possession of magazines holding more
than ten rounds are unconstitutional, no matter what standard a court uses.290
Such laws do not have historical precedent on their side, and they
278. Id. at 325.
279. Id. at 320–21.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 323.
282. BIRD, supra note 266, at 323.
283. See Duncan v. Becerra, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1134–35 (S.D. Cal. 2019); Colvin,
supra note 8, at 1076 n.235 and accompanying text.
284. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1156.
285. Id. at 1165–66.
286. See Duncan, 970 F.3d at 1168.
287. See supra Section V.
288. See supra Section V.
289. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Sections VI.A.1.a., VI.A.1.b.
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categorically ban arms protected by the Second Amendment.291 They are not
narrowly tailored or reasonably necessary to secure public safety.292 Whether
a court uses a text, history, and tradition approach or a Marzzarella style test,
laws prohibiting possession of magazines holding more than ten rounds are
unconstitutional.
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